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“The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand, how 
things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the 
broadest possible sense of the term”                          – Wilfrid Sellars1
The Background
My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate the debate between John 
McDowell and Michael Friedman on the nature of understanding and 
relativism. McDowell in his magnum opus Mind and World, has argued 
in favour of the view that the way we are open to reality is constituted by 
concepts. According to him, our openness to reality is placed in the space 
of reasons which is nothing but space of concepts. Friedman in his critical 
and detailed review2 of McDowell’s book has taken McDowell’s project in 
his book in particular and in his philosophy in general as the project of 
not constructing philosophical theories but of exorcising the philosophical 
traditions. It is indeed so as McDowell himself has acknowledged, because 
he closely follows Wittgensteinian quietism in his approach to various 
philosophical problems. While explaining how our knowledge and 
perception of the world among other things are situated in the rational space, 
towards the end of his book, McDowell relates space of reasons to language 
and tradition. Space of reasons, in his opinion, can be understood, in terms 
of initiating ourselves into language and inheriting the tradition. He thus 
says, “…the sort of language into which human beings are first initiated, 
serves as a repository of tradition, a store of historically accumulated 
wisdom about what is reason for what.”3 And here he is invoking Gadamer 
in a significant sense.
The Problem
According to Friedman, McDowell’s notion of space of reasons cannot be 
but many because each of us is situated in our own cultural tradition and 
initiated into a particular natural language. The historical situatedness of 
our cultural tradition in a significant sense constitutes our space of reasons. 
But if there are many spaces of reasons and each of them is associated with a 
particular cultural tradition and particular world which leads to conceptual 
divergence among them, then, Friedman argues – McDowell along with 
his ally Gadamer who is from a different philosophical tradition could fall 
into cultural and linguistic relativism. In this context, the question arises, 
how can we think of a space of reasons which involves the perspectives of 
others? If it cannot involve the perspectives of others – other traditions and 
cultures, then there cannot be a genuine space of reasons in the sense that 
it is just a product of one’s own conceptual construct possibly rooted in his 
or her tradition.
Friedman, in this context, asks – “One might wonder, accordingly, how 
McDowell himself would respond to the threat of cultural and linguistic 
relativism. Are we not faced, in particular, with the threat that there is not 
one space of reasons but many different ones – each adopted to its own 
cultural tradition and each constituting its own “world”?”4
Since there are different worlds corresponding to different cultural 
traditions and languages, thus the question arises, how the world of 
an alien subject, a subject from other tradition, is open to our view? Or 
how can we be available to one’s view? It is in this context, the issue of 
understanding others comes into the picture. As we saw, since space of 
reasons is understood in terms of our situatedness in a specific cultural 
tradition, there must be many spaces of reasons as there are many cultural 
traditions. But the seeming contradiction is present in McDowell’s position 
because, for him, the realm of conceptual, on the other hand, is unbounded. 
If space of concepts is unbounded, then how can we recognize that there 
are different spaces of concepts, other cultural and linguistic traditions 
outside the boundary of one’s own space of concepts? Or should we take 
other linguistic and cultural traditions as only a conceptual construction 
out of one’s own space of concepts? Answers to these questions partly 
depend on whether space of concepts is to be understood at the local level 
or at the global level. Unboundedness of space of concepts at the global 
level can be thought in the line of Hegelian absolute consciousness which 
does not acknowledge anything outside of it. At the local level, if different 
spaces of concepts are mutually exclusive to each other and each of them is 
formed in a specific horizon, then how will fusion of horizons be possible 
which McDowell along with his philosophical companion Gadamer 
from continental philosophy aimed at? Friedman, thus, alleged that both 
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McDowell and Gadamer fall into linguistic and cultural relativism. If our 
traditions are conceptually divergent from each other, both linguistically 
and culturally, then how can we actually avoid falling into relativism?
Friedman in this context asks, “…in what sense, however, is the world 
with which the alien thinker is engaged open to our view? For  McDowell 
… the realm of conceptual is unbounded … if the conceptual contents 
of an alien thinker’s engagements with the world are not yet available 
to us, therefore, how can the world corresponding to these conceptual 
contents be so? Are we not faced – before a fusion of horizons – simply 
with two different conceptual systems together with two different “worlds” 
constituted by these systems?”5
So, we can take into consideration three related charges that Friedman is 
leveling against the position of both Gadamer and McDowell, and see how, 
taking sources from both of them, we can avoid these charges.
Three charges leveled by Friedman
1. Falling into relativism – Both Gadamer and McDowell are vulnerable 
to relativism. Since a specific space of reasons is situated in a particular 
tradition, our understanding of the world of others would be relative 
to that space of reasons. Tradition and history can also be viewed as 
obstructions in our way of understanding other because we understand 
others always from a perspective which is inbuilt into one’s tradition 
and history. The further problem it leads to is that corresponding to 
different space of reasons there are different worlds. And since there are 
different worlds, understanding, in a particular context, is limited to 
one of these worlds but not in relation to the world as such. The upshot 
of this problem is that we cannot say that our understanding is about 
one and the same world.   
2. Falling into a bad form of idealism – How can we even talk about 
different worlds if space of concepts is unbounded? And if there 
are different space of concepts and corresponding to them we have 
different worlds, then how can we talk about fusion of horizons or 
fusion of space of concepts for that matter? If the space of concepts 
is unbounded, then the world seems to be taken as nothing but the 
mere conceptual construction. Our understanding of others could 
also be a conceptual construction on our part. In this context, it is not 
even possible to talk about the world of others, let alone the fusion of 
horizons and fusion of different world views. And these, i.e. relativism 
and bad form of idealism, take us to the third problem.
3. Impossibility of the fusion of horizons – If we are talking about 
different worlds as we are from different traditions, then how these 
worlds or world views are connected to each other? What about the 
objectivity of the world? Are we not living in the same world? Since 
we are talking about different worlds on the basis of different space of 
concepts we are in, it is not possible to talk about the world and in the 
absence of the objective world; the fusion of horizons would not make 
sense. Moreover, merely understanding other does not generally lead 
to a fusion of horizons and perspectives because in many cases it seems 
that we understand other but really not so.
In order to avoid these above charges, we can start by asking – how 
other cultures or people of other cultures are given to us in our experience? 
This question is significant because experiences of our selves and of others, 
in a way, constitute meeting points of different cultures. When we say that 
others are given to us in our experience, it is presupposed that we need 
to apply our concepts which are, as previously seen, from our tradition 
in order to understand that which is given to us. This givenness of other 
cultures needs to be understood in a better perspective for many reasons. 
Other cultures are not given to the people of one culture in a way which 
would put the other culture at the outer conceptual boundary of one’s own 
culture. The way other culture is given to us should not be a case of myth 
of the Given where it is given to us in such a way that in making sense 
of what is given to us about the other culture, we do not have any role to 
play as a linguistic or conceptual being. Conceptual contents or elements 
of one’s own tradition are operating in terms of conceptual capacities when 
one is trying to understand the other culture from a different horizon. This 
could be one of the reasons behind the critique of scheme/content dualism 
purposed by many philosophers, like Donald Davidson.
In his critique of scheme/content dichotomy, Davidson should not 
be understood as someone who is trying to abandon the world; rather 
what he is rejecting is the notion of world which is placed outside of all 
conceptual schemes. Our talk of various conceptual schemes is not directed 
towards detaching ourselves from the world as such, but, as Davidson 
says, it is “to reestablish our unmediated contact with the world…”6 On 
the contrary, when McDowell is talking about the conceptually mediated 
openness to reality, it is interpreted by Friedman as not openness as such 
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but as something which is conceptually constructed. This is a wrong 
interpretation because, for McDowell, the world is not the creation of our 
concepts, but in experiencing the world our space of concepts is drawn 
into operation. McDowell is a realist in a significant sense. One can extend 
this by saying that in our engagement with others, in our understanding of 
others, our space of concepts is drawn into operation. The world as such is 
not the creation of space of reasons as the repository of tradition. When we 
engage with the world or when we have the world in view, reasons from our 
historically situated tradition are coming into operation.
In understanding the other world view, our own worldview gets its new 
meaning when our worldview is available for fusion with other worldviews. 
It is in this sense we can talk about the independence of the world from a 
conceptual boundary or from a particular tradition. McDowell, thus, says 
“the horizon constituted by a specific situatedness in tradition is not closed. 
On the contrary, it is always open to “fusion” with horizon constituted by 
a different specific situatedness.”7 Here a seeming contradiction is present 
in McDowell’s position because he, on the one hand, is trying to maintain 
unboundedness of the conceptual and on the other hand, he is saying that 
specific situatedness is not closed. This contradiction will be effective if we 
place other culture and other spaces of reasons at the outer boundary of one 
specific culture or a precise space of reasons. The contradiction will also be 
effective if we think that our understanding of other is just a construction 
of the conceptual elements present in our culture. So, other worldviews 
are available to our own as the subject matter of their worldviews is not 
constituted by our thoughts about the world. We are not talking about 
different world views or different traditions in opposition to the world as 
such. 
Gadamer, in this context, would say – “those views of the world are not 
relative in the sense that one could oppose them to the “world in itself ”, as 
if the right view from some possible position outside the human, linguistic 
world could discover it in its being-in-itself.”8 To the contrary, for Gadamer, 
“in every world-view, the existence of the world-in-itself is intended.”9 
Gadamer states, “each worldview potentially contains every other one 
within it – i.e. each worldview can be extended onto every other.”10
The fact that we have different worldviews does not lead to a point 
where understanding among different worldviews is hampered because 
imagery of different worlds gives us the differences among different 
worldviews which are accessible to each other and these worldviews are 
about our world which is one for all of us. The pure subjective realm of one’s 
own worldview, I think, is put to scrutiny here because the worldview of 
one’s own is not radically different from the world we live in. The Cartesian 
notion of disengaged subject and its view which in a significant sense is the 
source of the problem of understanding can be put to rest if the worldviews 
are open to each other in the sense that these views are of the same world. 
“The imagery”, McDowell says, “is not making unavailable the point that 
there is one world.”11  
When Wittgenstein said “the limit of my language is the limit of my 
world”, he was not limiting the world in itself and one’s own limited world 
is of course not, because of its own historical consciousness, radically 
different from the world in itself. My teacher Prof. S. P. Gautam always used 
to remind us that it is the limitation of some one’s world, not the limitation 
of the world as such when we talk about the limitation of language. 
McDowell writes, “our worldview includes its own receptiveness to the 
possibility of correction, not only by efforts at improvement that are internal 
to our practices of inquiry, but also through coming to appreciate insights 
of other world views in the course of coming to understand them.”12
One’s worldview is open to others in the sense that it is self-critical and 
involves appreciation of other worldviews. In the process of understanding 
other, our own worldview gets its new meaning. Understanding among 
people of different linguistic and cultural traditions gives each of the traditions 
new meaning and brings out different dimensions. Each tradition with itself 
is also self-critical and there rests the possibility to be corrected by others. 
The possibility of rectification within each tradition, I think, is much more 
nuanced than just replacing one worldview by the other.  Being self-critical 
and appreciating others in understanding ourselves as well as others go hand in 
hand because it seems one is not possible without the other. It is possible that 
within a particular tradition, a perspective may be available which makes that 
tradition superior in relation to other traditions. But even in that case there are 
also other perspectives in that tradition which oppose this kind of attempt. So, 
a tradition even in this case remains self-critical and open to others.
Sideways-on picture of understanding
Bringing McDowell’s critique of sideways-on picture of understanding into 
this context would be of considerable importance in avoiding falling into 
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relativism. In understanding other’s world views, one should not adhere 
to the sideways on picture of our relationship with the world. Sideways 
on picture of understanding, I think, would superimpose a metaphysical 
boundary between one’s space of concepts and the world of others. 
McDowell writes, “We find ourselves always already engaging with the 
world in conceptual activity within such a dynamic system… It cannot be 
a matter of picturing the system’s adjustments to the world from sideways 
on: that is, with the system circumscribed within a boundary, and the world 
outside it. That is exactly the shape our picture must not take.”13
McDowell’s view on our engagement with the world is strikingly 
phenomenological when he says, “we always find ourselves always and 
already engaged in the world.” But what about our engagement with an 
alien thinker who is from a different cultural and linguistic tradition? How 
to make sense of the space of concepts and the corresponding world of a 
thinker for ourselves? The world with which the opaque thinker engages 
is already available to us in some way when we engage with that thinker. 
Our practical engagement with that thinker would be of considerable 
importance in understanding her world view. The world of an alien thinker 
should not figure as something outside of the conceptual system that we are 
in. In understanding an alien thinker, we are not adjusting our conceptual 
system to the world in which the alien thinker is situated. He says, “Of course 
we can initially find another thinker opaque. It may take work to make the 
conceptual contents of someone else’s engagements with the world available 
to us. And in the meantime, the world she engages with is surely already 
within our view. I have said nothing that threatens the obvious fact.”14
To understand an alien thinker is not to take that thinker as a part 
of our own conceptual system. It is not to say that we can construct the 
worldviews of other out of the elements present in our worldview. Doing 
this would, on the one hand, essentialize one’s own world view, and 
would give a dominating picture of our worldview over and above other 
worldviews. Recognizing that there are different worldviews would not lead 
to the impossibility of fusion of horizons. It happens when we take our 
worldview as the dominating worldview about the world.
McDowell, following Gadamer’s notion of “fusion of horizons”, says 
“When the specific character of her thinking starts to come into view for 
us, we are not filling in blanks in a pre-existing sideways-on picture of how 
her thought bears on the world, but coming to share with her a standpoint 
within a system of concepts, a standpoint from which we can join her in 
directing a shared attention at the world, without needing to break out 
through a boundary that encloses the system of concepts.”15
A conceptual framework or space of reasons which is historically 
situated can be understood in a better way by taking into consideration 
the practices of a particular tradition. But that does not make it fall into 
relativism. Relativism would come to the picture if our world view which is 
historically situated in a tradition is not open or receptive to other traditions. 
McDowell’s talk of space of reasons is not indifferent to the practices that 
we go through and which shape the contents of space of reasons.
Gadamer’s view on Understanding
I think McDowell’s view in this context has to be significantly 
supplemented by the phenomenological tradition particularly by the work 
of Gadamer and Heidegger in order to avert Friedman’s charge of relativism.
In order to engage with Gadamer’s phenomenology of understanding, 
one can take his view on conducting a conversation into consideration. 
For Gadamer, in conducting a conversation and if it is a genuine one, 
the conduct of the conversation is not under the control of the partners 
engaged in conversation. Partners of the conversation are led into the 
conversation rather than leading it as he says, “a genuine conversation is 
the one into which we fall. It is not the one which we wanted to conduct.”16 
The phenomenological notion of conversation tells us that falling into the 
conversation rather than leading it constitutes the essence of conversation. 
The essence of the conversation should not be prioritized against the nuances 
of actual conversation. Though we are coming from a particular tradition 
as participants of a conversation, this does not make us the leaders of the 
conversation. The very fact that we fall into a conversation ensures we are 
receptive to other horizons. Phenomenology of a conversation resists any 
attempt, on the part of the participants of a conversation, to essentialize the 
meaning of conversation. Participants of the conversation are not leaders 
of the conversation in terms of having a fixed set of beliefs, preconceived 
– before falling into it, about the conduct and the possible outcome of the 
conversation. On the contrary, by falling into the conversation without 
having preconceived notions about its possible outcome, we find meanings 
in it. The phenomenology of our experience of the conversation would give 
meaning to the conversation. 
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Gadamer is of the opinion that understanding is an event which happens 
to us rather than we making it happen. Partners of the conversation do not 
know about the possible outcome of the conversation before entering into 
a conversation. A genuine conversation, following Gadamer, one can say, is 
not scripted like the way some people give interview to the press. Meaning 
of the conversation is not preconceived or fixed by any of the partners 
of the conversation. In this context one can say that understanding in 
conversation is what happens when one horizon meets or encounters other 
horizons. It is necessary, for a genuine conversation, that all the partners 
of the conversations should be regarded as equal partners. A partner in 
the conversation should find himself as one among others and with others. 
Her own language and situatedness in the world should not be a barrier 
among other things in having a conversation with others. These factors 
should not also be manipulated for getting advantage over the others in 
conversation. Of course a particular partner of the conversation is entering 
into the conversation from the perspective of the particular horizon where 
she is situated, but the meaning of the conversation is revealed and open to 
all the partners when their horizons fuse into each other. Meaning of the 
conversation takes its turns as the conversation itself takes different turns. 
In this context Gadamer says, “Understanding is not based on transposing 
oneself into another person. To understand what a person says is… to come 
to an understanding about the subject matter, not to get inside another 
person and relive his experiences.” Understanding a person is not like the 
story of the movie ‘Inception’ where one enters another person’s mind in 
order to know the ideas in her mind. It is rather through our existential 
engagement we can understand a person.
J. N. Mohanty, emphasizing on Gadamer’s view on understanding says, 
“…understanding which itself is an ontological process – namely, a process 
of primary openness to the world and the other. Such an understanding is 
not the result of intellectual operations which one applies to a given object, 
it is rather the dynamic outcome of concrete engagement and dialogue, 
of a fusion of perspectives and horizons. What is important here is that 
an authentic understanding cannot arise from an intentional strategy, 
but only from a willingness to give oneself over to the facts themselves.”17 
Participants of a conversation reach at an understanding where language 
works as a medium. There must be conditions of understanding operating 
in every conversation that take place. Now the question arises, are we, as 
the partners of the conversation, always conscious of the conditions of the 
conversation while having the conversation? If we always become explicitly 
conscious of the conditions of the conversation, then it might disrupt 
the understanding in the conversation. Gadamer in this context says “in 
situations where coming to an understanding is disrupted or impeded, 
we first become conscious of conditions of understanding.”18 So when the 
flow or immersed nature of understanding breaks, we become explicitly 
conscious of various conditions of it. But when we are already in the process 
of understanding, we are not conscious of the conditions of understanding. 
When there is a disruption in understanding, then the conditions of 
understanding consciously come to the picture. Heidegger, as we can see, 
made a similar point in a different context. According to him, when we 
are hammering, we are not thinking about the hammer or hammering. 
When we face some problems in hammering, then we become conscious 
of different properties of the hammer as an object. Heidegger made this 
point in the context of our practical engagement with the objects in the 
world. This can also be extended to the context of understanding others. 
Another point which should be taken into account is that the conditions of 
understanding should not be set by any partners of the conversation.
Gadamer’s notion of understanding can be understood in a better 
perspective if we take into consideration his teacher Martin Heidegger’s 
view on the notion of understanding. According to Heidegger, the way we 
get around the world, the way we find ourselves in the world, the way we 
encounter the world, are associated with a certain sort of “understanding.” 
In his opinion, “my being in the world is nothing other than this already-
operating-with-understanding.”19 There are so many ways in which the 
term “understanding” is understood by philosophers. Many philosophers 
these days call it “pre-reflective self awareness.”20
The ontological distinction between our grasp of things and the things 
as has been traditionally seen is not even possible to construct. One can 
say that the ability to run and the ability to ride bicycles do not exist in our 
mind like our theoretical beliefs. It exists rather in our whole body. But 
this is not correct according to Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger. One should 
rather say that the ability exists in moving-in-this-environment. The locus 
of this environment is not my body or mind, but my “body-walking-the-
streets.” It is a holistic engagement and is an embedding knowledge where 
our particular engagement with the world blends our “explicit knowledge” 
of the situation and our “unarticulated know-how” together in a coherent 
manner.21 The traditional notion of mind and body which we have 
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inherited from the Cartesian tradition would not be able to give a better 
account of the way we engage with others and understand others. Our 
engagement with the things and people around us, according to Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty, is possible due to a kind of “understanding” which is 
also called “pre-understanding”. Objects show themselves to us not as mere 
objects. But they show themselves to us in their meanings or relevancies for 
our purposes, desires and activities. Objects are related to each other in the 
“nexus of their lived meanings.” We can understand the nature of different 
objects while engaging with them in different contexts.
According to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, propositions cannot 
capture the kind of world into which we are drawn into when we become 
involved in absorbed coping. We respond to various relevant affordances in 
the phenomenal field in our embodied coping. The world is directly lived 
by the absorbed subject as a shifting field of attractions and repulsions.
According to Heidegger, “human being (Dasein) is nothing but 
concerned absorption in the world.”22 In his opinion “circumspection”23 is 
the mode or way in which we became immersed in the world.
From Heidegger’s point of view when we go out of the room opening 
the door, we need not attend to the doorknob. We do not experience the 
doorknob as a doorknob. We just respond to the affordances it shows up 
to act on the basis of relevancies and meanings. Various affordances draw 
us to act on those at the opening of the door. We do not apprehend the 
door at all. In Heidegger’s opinion, we do not respond to or experience 
the door as affording to go out. The affording object, according to him, 
“withdraws”24 and we just act on that. Heidegger explains this with the 
example of hammering – “When hammering is going well, the hammer 
is not what I focus on. The hammer simply affords hammering; the less I 
perceive it the better. If, however, the hammering is usually difficult, I may 
experience the hammer as having the situational aspect of being too heavy 
under these conditions. And should things go even more badly so that I 
have to abandon my activity; the hammer may appear as an object that was 
the context free property of weighing five ponds.”25
The above view of Heidegger, it is wrong to think, is only confined to 
our understanding of physical objects of the world. It can also be applied in 
various ways to our understanding of people, culture and language among 
other things because in our everyday life we engage not only with objects 
but also with people from other cultures and linguistic traditions.  
Our ordinary coping which involves “pre-understanding” is understood 
by some phenomenologists as non-conceptual. It is non-conceptual in the 
sense that it does not incorporate the elements of our language in its locus. 
The explicit information which we constantly get from the environment 
draws us to act on that on the basis of lived meanings and relevancies in 
the level of “pre-understanding” without drawing any concepts. If it is non-
conceptual, then the question arises, how can the elements of our language 
and tradition can play a role in understanding others?
It is in this context, Gadamer’s view on the nature of our engagement 
and as it is interpreted by McDowell might be placed in a possible 
confrontation with Heidegger’s view on the same. Dreyfus’ demarcating 
view of McDowell and Gadamer from that of Heidegger on the nature 
of our engagement says, “McDowell like Gadamer, overlooks Heidegger’s 
claim that our free experience of a world differs from an animal’s unfree 
experience in a way that is more basic than our capacity to step back and 
emancipate ourselves from our involvement. Heidegger sees as essential 
the fact that human beings are free to open themselves to be bound – a 
freedom that animals lack because they are constantly captivated by their 
current activity and can never step back.”26 McDowell, following Gadamer, 
says that “thinkability” and “namability” as features of the world are always 
present in our experiential understanding of the world. For him, though it 
is true that we do not have a name or explicit knowledge already available 
to characterize or specify our understanding in experience, yet it has the 
conceptual content of certain sort, actually or potentially. The conceptual 
content of our experience is already available to us in a form which is 
implicit but this can be made explicit for us by “carving out an aspect of 
content from a world disclosing experience in terms of annexing a bit of 
language to it.”27 McDowell holds, “…whether or not a bit of experiential 
content is focused on and brought within the reach of a vocabulary... it is 
anyway present in the content of a world-disclosing experience in a form in 
which it is already either actually is, or has the potential to be appropriated 
as, the content of a conceptual capacity. That the content of an experience 
has that form is part of what it is for the experience to be world disclosing, 
categorically unified, apperceptive.”28
He also exploits the way Gadamer has made the “difference between a 
merely animal mode of life, in an environment and a human mode of life, in 
the world.”29 In his opinion, a non-rational animal is guided by “immediate 
biological imperatives”30 and their behaviour is a response to various forces 
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born out of these imperatives. They do not exercise reasons and reflect on 
the situation when they are responding to the biological forces. A life of this 
kind, following Gadamer’s view, one can say, “…is led not in the world, but 
only in an environment,”31 whereas the life of a mature human being is lived 
in a world. A non-rational animal just copes with the environment when 
he faces various problems. The problems he finds and the opportunities he 
exploits are product of his “immediate biological imperatives.” In the case 
of human being, even in responding to our biological needs, we are to be 
regarded as agents.
In McDowell’s opinion, in Gadamer we find a “…distinction between 
being oriented towards the world and merely inhabiting the environment.”32 
Gadamer says, “Man’s relation to the world is absolutely and fundamentally 
verbal in nature.”33 The above view of Gadamer can be better understood 
along with Heidegger’s view that “language is the house of being. In its home 
man dwells.”34 In Gadamer’s opinion, our distinctively human relationship 
with the world is pervasively conceptual and is in the “space of linguistically 
expressible thought.”35 According to him, the similarity that we share with 
non-rational animals cannot exhaust the nuances of our embodied coping 
in the world. Instead of this, he insists that language facilitates us to a 
““free, distanced orientation” towards what would otherwise have been 
merely features of an environment.”36 Being-in-the-world cannot escape 
the contours of our language. Our experience and understanding of other 
cannot break away from “expressible” or “namable” features of our language. 
This is already inbuilt into our understanding of other. Emphasizing on the 
role of language in our understanding is not to say that our understanding 
of other is already linguistically expressed – a conceptually constructed 
understanding on the part of the subject.     
For Gadamer, our language is instrumental to have unified experience 
which is at the same time opening the world for us. So, the content of our 
states of understanding is conceptual and at the same time have the worldly 
content. To say that our relationship with the world is verbal and linguistic 
is not to mean that we have always and already words available at our 
disposal when we engage with and understand people of our own as well as 
other communities.
McDowell in his critique of Dreyfus has also referred to the latter’s 
phenomenological heroes – Husserl and Heidegger as somehow responsible 
for Dreyfus’s position. But if we take a closer look at the works of Dreyfus’s 
phenomenological heroes independent of Dreyfus’ interpretation of them, 
perhaps we will realize that they are coming closer to McDowell in their 
philosophical position than to Dreyfus himself.37
In this paper, I have not only tried to work towards pro-
viding a framework for the possibility of fusion of horizons in 
the context of language, culture and tradition, but also worked 
towards the fusion of philosophical traditions, particularly of an-
alytic and continental traditions, which are very often seen as op-
posed to each other.
Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to address Friedman’s charges which he has 
leveled against McDowell’s position. In understanding other from the 
perspective of where one is situated need not necessarily take us to fall 
into relativism. Our engagement with others takes place in the domain of 
language. For genuine understanding to be possible we need to stress on 
the point that our conceptual frameworks are not mutually exclusive from 
each other. This goes in agreement with McDowell’s point that conceptual 
does not have an outer boundary. In the process of understanding others, 
their world views are already available to us. Others’ worldviews are not 
situated outside the boundary of one’s own conceptual sphere. To say that 
the worldviews of others are not situated outside one’s own conceptual 
boundary is not to say that those worldviews are constructed out of the 
elements of one’s own conceptual framework. If we can maintain in our 
position that understanding the world from the perspectives of different 
linguistic and cultural traditions is the understanding of the same world, 
then we can avoid falling into relativism.
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